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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TAJ BECKER, MD,
Plaintiff-Appellant pro se,
Case No. 20060495 - CA

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE
(MEDICAID),
Defendant - Appellee

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (West 2004). On May 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme
Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. R 595, 648.

REPLY TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S BRIEF
1.

Plaintiff did not fail to marshall evidence in support of the district court's

decision that the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (hereafter MFCU) was not an agent of
Medicaid (see p. 1-5 of Appellant's Brief). The District Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law did not cite any precedent case law in its support and
Plaintiff/Appellant (hereafter Becker) could only surmise that the Court's findings were
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based on the entire court record, the trial testimony and the contract language itself,
including the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter CFR), Utah Statutes and Medicaid
CFR regulations, etc. She did so in a manner most favorable to the District Court.
2.

The issue of agency was decidedly not "the sole issue addressed at the bench

trial" as claimed by Medicaid. Moreover, the state defendant in his brief (p. 2) correctly
cites the Standard of Review: "The question of whether an agency relationship exists is
one of fact which we review for an abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305 (Utah 1998). However, the court below did not entertain that issue under its "Finding
of Facts". Rather, the existence of agency was rejected by the District Court exclusively
under "Conclusions of Law": # 3, 4, 6, 7, 10.
Dr. Becker alleges that the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied the plain
language of the laws, federal regulations and state statute thereby committing substantial
and prejudicial error and abuse of discretion. See Pena, 869 P. 2d at 936, Utah 1994.
In addition to the agency issue, the honorable District Court by its finding of Fact
#5 also ruled that during the MFCU's investigation Dr. Becker requested that the MFCU
request that Medicaid review the MFCU's initial determination [of Dr, Becker's
upcoding/false claims], and that Medicaid folly complied with the MFCU's request and
agreed in their response that Dr. Becker did indeed overcharge Medicaid, a potential
felony.
In its conclusions of law #7 the court below further found that this communication
from Medicaid to the MFCU implicating Dr. Becker with a potential Second Degree
Felony (subsequently thus filed by the MFCU) did not"... impose any duty on the
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Defendant under the Provider Agreement" [Contract], and therefore; #11, "Medicaid met
all its legal and contractual duties to provide Defendant (sic) due process, including
notice and an opportunity to be heard."
Continuing with conclusion of law #12, the court below found that after trial
testimony ... "Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of contract by Defendant or any
damages caused to Plaintiff by Defendant." - dismissing Plaintiffs complaint on the
merits.
The above is offered as rebuttal to the state's claim that agency was the sole issue
ruled on by the district court.
3.

Defendant-Appellee's STATEMENT OF THE CASE erroneously cites (Rl 1)

of the complaint as indicating that Dr. Becker alleges "...breaches of the contract were
the actions of the MFCU, not any actions of the Defendant."
What Dr. Becker's complaint actually states there is that Defendant-Appellee
DOH-Medicaid by acquiescence and custom...wrongfully delegated a duty reasonably
relied upon by the Plaintiff to its non-compliant agent-designee (MFCU) which deprived
Plaintiff of a material part of her bargain, breaking the bilateral contract and resulting in
major damages.
This, inter alia, clearly states that Becker alleges breach of contract by Medicaid
and not by the MFCU which is not a party to the case at bar. The District Court's earlier
ruling denying the Defendant-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss and Change of Venue under
RCP 12(b)(6) and 19 (signed by the Honorable Judge Beacham April 7,2003) clearly and
properly held:
Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo
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"The purpose of the rule is to insure that the interests of absent parties are
protected and to avoid multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations.
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P3d 734, 740 (Utah 2002).
"UDOH has not shown that MFCU has any interest in the outcome of this case.
The cause of action involves a claim of breach of contract between UDOH and Dr.
Becker. While MFCU may have acted inappropriately during its investigation of
Dr. Becker, it is only the breach of contract claim that is present before the court.
While agents of the MFCU may be called on as witnesses in the case, their
presence is not necessary to determine whether DOH acted in a manner contrary to
its alleged contract with Dr. Becker. Consequently, MFCU is not an indispensable
party and the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 19 is denied." [ADDENDUM A]

Moreover, Dr. Becker rejects Defendant-Appellee's misleading footnote (2) - p. 3
which alleges that her federal claims against the MFCU on unrelated constitutional
issues [First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments] "... arise out of the same
circumstances as does the current contract claim against the Department of Health."
Medicaid or it's personnel is not a defendant in the federal case.
4.

Dr. Becker agrees with the lower Court's finding of facts 1 through 5, most

importantly #5 which clearly found that Medicaid during the MFCU's investigation
reported, in answer to the MFCU's request, that Becker had up-coded and that there was
possible fraud. The "during the MFCU investigation" time period is 1998 - 1999 and not
to be confused with Medicaid's much later untimely reporting that finding to Dr. Becker
years later in December, 2000, at which time the MFCU litigation had already concluded
in Dr. Becker's favor.
5.

Dr. Becker in her Brief to the Appeals Court has already adequately

challenged the State's assertion that the MFCU or Medicaid is financed by the Federal
Centers for Medicare/Medicaid (hereafter CMS) or CMS's Inspector General.
Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo
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6.

Dr. Becker has demonstrated at length during trial and in her complaint and

motions that she views the MFCU as an (apparent) agent of Medicaid for the exclusive
issue of the constructive notice to Medicaid of Dr. Becker's alleged upcoding. Becker's
reliance was chiefly based on representations made by the MFCU and assent by Medicaid
to these representations. The Defendant-Appellee misstated Medicaid's Mr. Steven
Gatzemeier's testimony as having advised Dr. Becker that the MFCU and Medicaid
"...were independent entities." (Trial Transcript 171:17 R 601:171-72). Mr. Gatzemeier
used the term "bifurcated" which is not a synonym to independent!
In any event, many of Mr. Gatzemeier's assertions were found by Dr. Becker not
to comport with the facts and she did not take these as controlling her own findings.
7.

Contrary to the Defendant-Appellee's averments in his brief, Dr. Becker does

not anywhere seek to hold Medicaid/DOH liable for alleged misconduct by the MFCU.
As a matter of fact, she would have had no reason to even mention the MFCU in this
breach of contract case had it not been for Medicaid's years-long concealment and denial
of the crucial fact- (now admitted by the defense and court below) - that Medicaid had
itself confirmed MFCU's early (1998-1999) request related to the fraud unit's
preliminary allegation that Dr. Becker had submitted false claims by up-coding.
Medicaid's 1998-1999 notice of Dr. Becker's culpability mandated the CFR's
unambiguous Medicaid duty to conduct a preliminaiy investigation to confirm or reject
the allegation. If confirmed, as in this case, the violation must be communicated to the
accused "promptly" for repayment and demand that the accused bring her "burden of

Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo
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proof to Medicaid as per Contractual Agreement: See CFR § 455.14 and Provider
Agreement B-2.
In addition, Medicaid likewise failed to perform its duty by denying Dr. Becker
the opportunity to give evidence of her innocence at the lowest level under Utah
Administrative Code R410-14-1; Utah Administrative Procedures Act 63-46-bl(4)(a) and
by the promises of Medicaid's controlling 1998 Provider Manual, all admitted parts of
the contract (5.210 Administrative Hearing).
8.

Medicaid's revelations to the MFCU that Becker was fraudulently upcoding

gave a decisive and foreseeable impetus to the MFCU's decision to prosecute. The
resultant costly, fruitless litigation v. Becker only relates to her claimed damages
accountable to Medicaid's breach alone. Damages was an issue not reached by the court
below because it found no breach of contract existed.
As pleaded at length, Plaintiff decidedly does not base her claim for breach upon
agency, a theory which she advanced in order to show that Medicaid had constructive
notice of Dr. Becker's upcoding; - and a duty to respond as per contract, notwithstanding
any legal or illegal action pursued by the MFCU separately. See Addendum B., Becker's
7/7/99 letter to the MFCU (Kroll), requesting MFCU to notify Medicaid of the alleged
up-coding*
9.

Dr. Becker does not anywhere contest the authority of the MFCU to lawfully

acquire her coding information and medical charts in order to investigate for Medicaid
crime or abuse as indicated in the contract and controlling CFRs.

Appellate No.200604 95:Pitf Reply Memo
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10.

Supporting case law listed in Defendant's brief primarily referred to agency

related questions on appeal from a lower court's summary judgment.
In Bank Salt Lake v. Corp, President cited by Defendant Appellee, the Utah
Supreme Court relied on Utah's Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-1-201 as defining the
criteria for "notice":

11.

[39]

The pertinent provisions of § 70A-1-201, U.C.A. 1953, as amended are:

[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]

(25) A person has actual "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.

[44]

A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar
import refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and
circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be
effective are not determined by this act.

[45]

(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or a notification to another by
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know if it. A
person "receives" a notice or notification when
[46] (a) it comes to his attention; or
[47] (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for
receipt of such communications.

Undisputedly, according to the surprise trial testimony, both Medicaid

(Gatzemeier) and the MFCU (Kroll) concur that prior to any litigation filed v. Dr.
Becker, Medicaid had notice and active participation satisfying the above U.C.C.'s
requirements.

Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo
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The Honorable 5th District Judge likewise acknowledged this fact in his
"FINDINGS OF FACT #5.
Setting the agency issue aside, while not conceding, PlaintifI7Appellant Dr.
Becker, alleges again that these admissions alone clearly establish Medicaid's breach of
contract as cited in her brief (see inter alia^Contract B-2)CFR§ 455.14 .
12.

Contrary to Defendant-Appellee's claim, Dr. Becker has fully shown the legal

insufficiency supporting the District Court's finding (pp. xx and xxi of Plaintifl7
Appellant's brief).
Plaintiff has also shown that the MFCU routinely conducted its modus operandi
(e.g. representing Medicaid) with the assent of the principal as manifest in their
operations manual with the MFCU wherein Medicaid designated the MFCU as their
agent for the special purposes: "DHCF [Division of Health Care Finance-which is
Medicaid] designates MFCU and its personnel as duly authorized agents of DHCF for
purposes of reasonable or immediate access as defined in the Provider Agreement for
Medicaid and UMAP, to provider records and facilities for detection, investigation, or
prosecution of fraud..." (emphasis supplied). (See Trial Transcript 242:14 and
Addendum C).
Defendant-Appellee and the District Court both assert that any agency relationship
between the MFCU and Medicaid is "prohibited by law..." Defendant-Appellee refers to
CFR § 1007.9(a) as the 'law' which supposedly prohibits agency: "The Unit must be
separate and distinctfromthe Medicaid agency."

Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo
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Defendant-Appellee thereafter in his Brief misstates and confuses the term
"distinct" with "independent". However, these terms are not interchangeable or related
and the attempt is misleading.
13.

Dr. Becker's reliance on an MFClPs special/apparent agent or designee status

was prudent and reasonable for the sole purpose of establishing constructive notice to
Medicaid of alleged fraudulent Medicaid billing by her as claimed by the MFCU's
subpoena duces tecum in aid of a criminal investigation in 1998. [Addendum D]
14.

The Defendant-Appellee's assertion (p. 13 of Appellee's Brief) that the

MFCU's proffered Settlement Agreement to Dr. Becker (Addendum D of DefendantAppellee's brief), clearly identifies ("Medicaid") as a short form abbreviation for the
MFCU is disingenuous. The single term 'Medicaid' is used throughout the 5 page
settlement proposal. Notably especially in #9 of the proposal "No sanction: [1] Medicaid
and the [2] State of Utah agree that nothing herein shall be construed as a sanction upon
Becker, (emphasis and [1] and [2] supplied). Only DOH-Medicaid can 'sanction' a
physician, i.e. exclude him from the Medicaid program (See CFR § 455.16 (c)(4). The
MFCU has no such authority.
[1] "Medicaid* here refers to DOH-Medicaid while the [2] 'State of Utah'
represents the MFCU which seeks to offer a settlement agreement asserting it would
bind not only the State MFCU but also the assenting and included Medicaid agency to
its terms.

Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo
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This clearly evidences the MFCU's asserted power and agency in behalf of
Medicaid by their mutual collaboration "agreeing]" to settle the matter - a collaboration
mandated by the CFR § 455.21 (a)(3). (Appellant's Brief Addendum B).
These facts satisfy all the prongs ofLuddington cited by Appellee in his
brief Indeed, Dr. Becker would have been unjustifiably amiss in construing that an
agency relationship did not exist.
15.

Dr. Becker has already treated her opposition to Defendant's assumption that

by law the MFCU is independent from DOH-Medicaid which Defendant apparently
based on the word "distinct" in the CFR.
Hereafter in his Brief, Defendant-Appellee abandons the term 'distinct' in his
Brief and instead interjects the misleading term 'independent' throughout his argument.
However, Black's Law Dictionary, 5* Edition p. 425, citing Gavin v. Webb, Tex, Civ.
App., 99 S.W. 2d 372, 379., does not include 'independent' in its summary of several
interchangeable terms under 'distinct'.
Indeed, hundreds of private and governmental entities are 'distinct' and by no
means independent of their controlling departments, - e.g. Medicaid under DOH, etc.
16.

As to Defendant-Appellee's reiteration of the punctuation issue in the contract,

Dr. Becker has already admitted her error (see appellant's brief pp. 4 & 5) under
"Marshalling the Pro-Court argument".
17.

Defendant-Appellee's assertion (Brief p. 16) that "...Plaintiff failed to present

any evidence in the district court that established an agency relationship..." is folly

Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo
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controverted, - inter alia, - by the trial transcript: 216:15 to 22,224:11 to 226:7,242:1423, 243:10-17, 254:10-23, 271:2-8, 246:10-11, and 245:13-16.
Plaintiff-Appellant's CONCLUSION
Appellant/Plaintiff (Becker) has offered abundant colorable evidence that the
MFCU presented itself as a collaborative special/apparent agent of Medicaid. Medicaid,
in turn, was aware that the MFCU was negotiating a settlement to which they assented to
be bound by (Trial transcript 50:3 - to - 56:3). This is clearly a manifestation of the
principal Medicaid to allow its 'distinct' apparent agent to operate in its behalf and to
Medicaid's monetary benefit
Dr. Becker maintains that the lower court and Defendant-Appellee's procedure to
obfuscate this contract suit between Dr. Becker and DOH-Medicaid into a suit
exclusively depending on the existence of agency is the dominant fallacy in this case.
Once more, Dr. Becker was compelled to pursue the theory of apparent agency
exclusively to substantiate that the early 1998-1999 up-coding allegation from the MFCU
to Medicaid gave Medicaid constructive notice of Becker's possible fraudulent billings,
thereby triggering Medicaid's contractual duty of a preliminary investigation, i.e. request
to make restitution or to bring her "burden of proof to show the correctness of her
coding/billing (Contract B-2). Nowhere does she seek to join or hold the MFCU
responsible. She only alleges breach of contract by Medicaid.
The honorable Court of Appeals need not even visit the agency issue which is now
practically obviated by trial testimony implicating Medicaid directly in 1998-1999.

Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo
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That undisputed trial testimony established that Medicaid secretly issued a finding
of Dr. Becker's culpability to the MFCU at the start of the criminal investigation (19981999) transmitted to the MFCU. This was done without notice to her and deprived her of
a very material contractual right (Contract B-2) which would possibly have been a
substantial motive for Becker to consider a civil settlement as proposed by the MFCU at
the time, obviating litigation.
Trial testimony further established that no law or rule existed to prevent Medicaid
from performing this contractual duty to promptly inform Dr. Becker and invite her to
produce exculpatory evidence at the lowest level (R410-14-1) [A part of the Contract].
Most importantly, Medicaids Brief and the Court below in it's decision has failed
to overcome Medicaid's clear obligation and unambiguous mandated duty to under CFR
§ 455.14: [A part of the contract]
"If the agency receives a complaint of Medicaid fraud or abuse from any
source or identifies any questionable practices it must conduct a
preliminary investigation..,."
Moreover: Utah Administrative Procedures Act 63-46 bl(4)(a) [A part of the Contract]:
(4) "This chapter does not preclude any agency, prior to the beginning of
an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an
adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with both parties...to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery;
(v) expedite the proceedings..."

Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo
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Medicaid clearly failed in their duty of the agreement, callously and in bad faith,
and thereby breached the contract.
For the stated reasons, Dr. Becker respectfully prays that the Honorable Utah
Court of Appeals reverse the Dismissal by the Fifth District Court which was ordered
against the clear weight of the trial evidence, erroneous and unsupported by the record in
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED
OPINION.

Respectfully submitted this

//

day of December, 2006

' A/

J^CJCM/

PlaintiflMppellant pro se, Taj Becker; M.D.

Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the fi^day
of December
, 2006, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid Certified Mail with
Return Receipt Requested, to the following:

BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Hand Delivered
Mailed, overnight delivery
Faxed
Taj Becker, M.D., Plaintiff Pro Se
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ADDENDUM "A

I I I

>

«-

*

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CpTOTFOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAJ BECKER, MD,
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND CHANGE OF VENUE

Plaintiff Pro Se,
v.

Civil No. 020501574
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCE (MEDICAID); Rod Betit,
Executive Director,

Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss and Change of Venue
filed by Defendant on January 27, 2003

Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant's Motions on February 4, 2003
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having reviewed the relevant law, and being fully
advised in the premises, the court now rules as follows*

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Taj Becker, M D , (hereinafter "Dr Becker") is a Utah licensed Neurologist who
practices in St George

On September 25, 1994, Dr, Becker entered into an agreement with

Defendant, Utah Division of Health (Medicaid), (hereinafter "UDOH") to be a provider ofMedicaid
services On November 17,1998, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, (hereinafter "MFCIT), obtained
a large number of Dr Becker's patient medical records for review Subsequently, MFCU alleged that

-2-

Dr. Becker's records revealed some coding errors that were higher than an examination of the
patient's notes warranted. MFCU used these records to infer that Dr. Becker had filed similar
erroneous claims over afiveyear period resulting in a repayment and penalty assessment of $680,000.
This was eventually reduced to $3 5,000 with continued investigation of Dr. Becker's medical records.
Dr. Becker requested, and was denied, an administrative hearing of the claims made against her.
On June 24. 1999, a civil suit wasfiledagainst Dr. Becker. This civil case was later dismissed
without prejudice on July 8, 1999 and a criminal case wasfiledagainst Dr. Becker. The criminal case
was dismissed with prejudice on September 6, 2000.
On August 14, 2002, Dr. Becker filed this lawsuit against UDOH, citing a breach of the
contract entered into by the parties. Dr. Becker alleges that UDOH breached the contract by
allowing MFCU to perform an investigation and subsequently to file a civil suit against Dr. Becker
and by failing to provide an administrative review of the situation as required by the contract.
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b)(6) AND 19
The bases of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 19 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are insufficient to approve of the motions. In each circumstance, the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure has a test that must be met and, in each case, Defendant fails to make a showing
that the test is met.
Under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a case may be dismissed if the plaintiff
has failed to join an indispensable party. UDOH argues that Dr. Becker has failed to join all of the
indispensable parties in the case by her failure to include MFCU as a party to the case. Rule 19(a)
explains that a party is necessary if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
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that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest.
The purpose of the rule is to insure that the interests of absent parties are protected and to avoid
multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations. Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P. 3d 734, 740
(Utah 2002).
UDOH has not shown that MFCU has any interest in the outcome of this case. The cause of
action involves a claim of breach of a contract between UDOH and Dr. Becker. While MFCU may
have acted inappropriately during its investigation of Dr. Becker, it is only the breach of contract
claim, that is present before the court. While agents of MFCU may be called on as witnesses in the
case, their presence is not necessary to determine whether UDOH acted in a manner contrary to its
alleged contract with Dr. Becker. Consequently, MFCU is not an indispensable party and the Motion
to Dismiss under Rule 19 is denied.
UDOH also alleges that Dr. Becker's claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. In its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, UDOH argues that Dr. Becker is
unable to make a claim as there was no contract between Dr. Becker and UDOH and that no
relationship existed between UDOH and MFCU that would make UDOH liable for MFCU's actions.
This argument, however, does not meet the requirements for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In determining
the validity of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor," Mounteer v. Utah Power
&LightCo., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat1'IBank, 767P.2d
935, 938 (Utah 1988). The Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Russell v. The Standard Corporation, 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). Thus, the Court
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must accept Dr. Becker's claim that a contract existed between the parties and that MFCU was an
agent of UDOH. Therefore, UDOH's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
UDOH has also filed a Motion for Change of Venue, stating that the Fifth District Court is
an improper venue under § 78-13-9 of the Utah Code. Section 78-13-9 allows a court to change the
place of trial for several reasons, including when the county designated in the complaint is not the
proper county and when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by
the change. UDOH argues that the action should be heard in Salt Lake County, on the basis of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-17, which allows actions against the state to be brought in either Salt Lake
County or the county in which the claim arose.
The law allows a plaintiff to chose the court in which to bring her claim, as long as the place
of venue is related to the contract and the contract itself does not have a provision limiting the proper
venue In this case, § 63-30-17 takes the place of a venue selection clause of the contract. The
Legislature has limited the proper venue for contractual claims against the state to the county where
the contract arose or Salt Lake County.
UDOH argues that Salt Lake County, the site of the denial of the administrative hearing, is
the only proper venue because Dr. Becker's claim arises from UDOH's failure to provide an
administrative hearing. This argument follows a limited view of Dr. Becker's claims. Dr. Becker
claims that the contractual relationship between the parties was breached not only by UDOH's failure
to have the administrative review, but also UDOH's failure to facilitate a preliminary investigation
prior to the administrative review and UDOH's failure to properly supervise MFCU in their
investigation. The MFCU investigation of Dr. Becker's medical records occurred, and UDOH's
alleged failure to perform a preliminary investigation would have occurred, in Washington County.

-5Therefore, Washington County is a proper venue as it is the county in which the claim arose. UDOH
has not made any significant claims of inconvenience, especially as the medical records from which
the investigation first arose remain in Washington County. Since Dr. Becker was entitled to choose
either Washington County or Salt Lake County, the Motion for Change of Venue is denied.
Dated this 7

day of April, 2003.

G. RAND BEACHAM, District Court Judge

-6-

CERTMCATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 10 day of April, 2003,1 mailed true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Taj Becker, M.D.
Plaintiff Pro Se
630 South 400 East, Suite #102
St. George, Utah 84770
Lyle Oldendahl
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
P.O. Box 141000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1000

Deputy Court Clerk

ADDENDUM "B

TAJ N. BECKER, M.D.
Neurology
Dipiomate, Ameripan Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
630 South 400 East, Suite # 102
St. George, UT 84770
phone (801) 688-7800 / fax (801) 688-7801

7/7/99
Mr. J. Denis Kroll
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit
State of Utah
5272 S. College Dr. #200
Murray, UT 84123-2611

Dear Mr. Kroll:
This is to inform you that I have decided NOT to settle the legal action initiated against
me by the State of Utah arising from the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's criminal
investigation of my medical practice upon careful review of your latest proposal dated
6/24/99.
I am fully aware of the loss of time and the many tens of thousands of dollar expenses I
will incur if you choose to litigate. Nevertheless, the ramifications of the MFCU's false
accusations against me are of such serious nature that it would very likely irreparably
impair my continuing the practice of medicine if left unchallenged.
If you will not dismiss this action, or refer your findings back to the Utah Health Care
Finance Administration for evaluation and non-criminal resolution between that Agency
and myself, I have no reasonable alternative but to await your filing of charges before the
proper court where I am confident to have a fair hearing of the matter in controversy.

Taj N. Becker, MJD.
Sent, certified mail with return receipt requested

*7 -"? - ? ^

BECKER 0386

ADDENDUM "C
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Utah
Department
of Health
&m9*QhJ£i

frrfot/J*<*/

Coverage
and
Reimbursement
Policy
Medicaid
Program Integrity Unit
Operations Manual

February 2001

0 0 0,0.1

At the earliest practical time, advise MFCU of any matter with resp'ect to which
DHCF has suspicion of fraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation.
Cooperate with MFCU to establish a case-specific plan for coordinating action with
respect to any matter in which MFCU is undertaking an investigation into allegations
offraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation. If MFCU requests that
DHCF refer any such matter to MFCU for investigation and possible prosecution,
DHCF shall comply with that request.
Pursuant to 42 CFR §455.21 (a)(2), if MFCU determines that it may be useful in
carrying out MFCU's responsibilities, DCHF shall promptly comply with any
reasonable request from MFCU for (a) access to, and free copies of, any records or
information kept by the agency or its contractors; (b) computerized data stored by the
agency or its contractors. These data must be supplied without charge and in the
form requested by MFCU. DHCF shall provide MFCU with any records or
information kept by a provider of services pursuant to § 1902(a)(27) of the Social
Security Act, 42 CFR § 431.107, §431.115, Subpart E § 424.50, et seq., DHCF's
regulations, or the Medicaid provider agreements as may be in the possession of
DHCF and deemed necessary in carrying out its responsibilities under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act. Further, MFCU may request such records or information
which it reasonably determines to be necessary in the detection, investigation, or
prosecution of fraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation, DHCF
designates MFCU and its personnel as duly authorized agents of DHCF for purposes
of reasonable or immediate access as defined in the Provider Agreement for
Medicaid and UMAP, to provider records and facilities for detection, investigation,
or prosecution of fraud or patient abuse, neglect or exploitation.
DHCF shall make its employees available to MFCU without charge to advise MFCU
on matters relating to MFCU investigations on a schedule agreed upon by the parties,
and to testify at trials.
DHCF will cooperate as requested with the criminal investigation of any case
referred to MFCU. DHCF recognizes that MFCU will be undertaking, as part of
its responsibilities, investigations offraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient
exploitation on the basis of information obtained independent of any referral from
DHCF. DHCF recognizes that these investigations are an inherent part of MFCU's
responsibilities and will provide these investigations the same degree of assistance
as it would in any investigation initiated by referral from DHCF.
Whenever DHCF plans to undertake an administrative action to recover an
overpayment or to establish abuse in the provision of medical services involving a
provider that is under investigation for fraud, patient abuse, neglect or exploitation,
DHCF will consult with MFCU to ensure that the planned administrative action is
coordinated with MFCU. This shall include the following steps:
1.
Details of the planned administrative action shall be made by DHCF to
MFCU for review, including any additional information developed by DHCF
which may be germane to MFCU's action. Following such referral, DHCF
shall hold the matter in abeyance for a period of at least thirty (30) days to
permit MFCU review.
2.
All administrative settlements, sanctions and decisions of DHCF must
-37-
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Date /Hi-fa
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Upon JML2MJ2£££g£
Utah Department of Public Safety

J. DENIS KROLL - 1858
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
5272 College Drive, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: 801-284-6253

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

NO,

s <7^^a

THE STATE C? UTAH TO:
TAJ N

3ECXER, M.D.
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a confidential

to disclose
YOU

Services

MAY
THE

the
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investigation
of

this

Subpoena t o
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AND

and you
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DOCUMENTS

OFFICER/AGENT SERVING THIS SUBPOENA UPON YOU,

are

requested

anyone.

THIS

SUBPOENA

REQUESTED

TO

BY
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You are hereby

commanded

to set aside all business and

excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General of the
State

of Utah,

Bureau

of Medicaid

Fraud,

Murray, Utah 84123, at the hour of
the 23rd day of November
supjppyt of a criminal

5272 College Drive,

a.m., on Monday

,

, 1998, to give testimony in

investigation.

You are entitled

to be

represented by legal counsel at the time of this examination.
You are also

commanded

to bring with you the following

documents and all records pertaining thereto:
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A

This subpoena is authorized by order of the District Court.
DATED this

day of

) llTtt^K^^

1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney Genera]/

;

J . / D E N I S KROLL
Assistant Attorney General
"'Attorneys for State of Utah

WITNESS : THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICI A L J H STRICT
COURT j./} andj for SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, this S T d a y of
, 1998.
| ATTEST my hand and the seal of said Court the day and year
last above written.
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